Key Takeaways
- Used cooking oil prices broke 50 cents per pound at the end of 2024 — a clear signal that the feedstock everyone has been planning around is already running out.
- US SAF capacity grew about 14-fold in 2024 to roughly 30,000 barrels per day, but actual output stayed under 17 million gallons. Capacity announcements and real production are not the same number.
- HEFA still dominates, but its ceiling is structural: every gallon needs roughly 1.5 gallons of fats, oils, or greases, and global supply is not scaling with demand.
- LanzaJet's commercial alcohol-to-jet plant in Georgia changes the math. Ethanol is abundant, infrastructure exists, and the cost floor sits well below HEFA.
- The likely 2030 winner is whoever locks down the largest, lowest-cost, most reliable feedstock supply chain — Chinese municipal waste plus Fischer-Tropsch is the wildcard that could leapfrog everything else.
The Moment the Story Pivoted
In November 2025, LanzaJet's Freedom Pines facility in Georgia began producing jet fuel from ethanol at commercial scale. It was the first time anyone had successfully run alcohol-to-jet at industrial volumes. For people watching the sustainable aviation fuel sector, that was the moment the story pivoted. Not because LanzaJet "won," but because it proved a second pathway can actually work outside of a pilot plant. That alone reshapes the conversation.
The reason this matters is simple. For the past decade, the SAF race has been framed as a contest between technologies — HEFA, alcohol-to-jet, Fischer-Tropsch, power-to-liquid — with everyone arguing about efficiency, carbon intensity, and theoretical cost. But the real competition has quietly shifted underneath that debate. The race today is about feedstock. Whoever can secure the largest, cheapest, most reliable raw material stream is going to win, regardless of how elegant their conversion process looks.
The Feedstock Crisis Is Already Here
Used cooking oil tells the story most clearly. By the end of 2024, UCO prices crossed 50 cents per pound. That sounds like a small number until you realize it represents a fundamental supply crunch. UCO is the backbone of today's HEFA-based SAF, and the world's collected supply is not big enough to support the capacity that has already been announced.
The US imports roughly 2.8 billion pounds of used cooking oil a year, mostly from China. Stop and think about that. America has vast agricultural resources and one of the largest food industries on the planet, and it still relies on importing waste cooking oil from the other side of the world to make sustainable jet fuel. That dependency creates supply risk, price volatility, and political exposure all at once — and it is already showing up in plant economics.
Capacity Announcements Are Not Production
The numbers from 2024 are striking. US SAF production capacity exploded from around 2,000 barrels per day to nearly 30,000 — a fourteen-fold increase. Diamond Green Diesel brought a 15,000 barrel-per-day facility online at Port Arthur, Texas. Phillips 66 commissioned a 10,000 barrel-per-day plant in California. On paper, the industry should have flooded the market.
But by August 2024, total US SAF output was only about 16.5 million gallons. Phillips 66 even halted its California facility temporarily in the fourth quarter — officially for "operational optimization," but industry insiders consistently point at feedstock availability and economics. When a major refiner with decades of experience cannot keep a SAF unit running profitably, that is not a one-off. It is a structural signal.
Capacity is what gets announced. Production is what gets delivered. The gap between those two numbers is the SAF industry's real margin of error.
China Is Playing a Different Game
While Western producers fight over a finite UCO pool, Chinese producers are building toward a completely different feedstock base. Rather than chasing waste cooking oil, they are targeting municipal solid waste and food waste streams. The numbers there are an order of magnitude bigger. China generated roughly 120 million tonnes of food waste in 2020, projected to hit 170 million tonnes by 2025. That is not a niche supply — that is the actual organic matter coming out of cities every day, available for gasification and Fischer-Tropsch synthesis into jet fuel.
The Chinese policy posture matches the feedstock strategy. The official 2025 production target is a modest 50,000 tonnes, but announced capacity already exceeds 3.32 million tonnes per year. Sinopec's joint venture with Total for a 230,000 tonne facility is just the leading edge. Regional players are building 200,000 tonne plants in places like Sichuan with explicit plans to expand to 500,000 tonnes. This is the classic Chinese industrial pattern: build the capacity first, figure out the demand later, and ride down the cost curve while everyone else is still permitting.
The implication is uncomfortable for most Western forecasters. By 2027 to 2030, China could become a major SAF exporter — not because they planned for that, but because their domestic build will overshoot domestic demand. If that happens, the feedstock crunch in the West gets routed through a Chinese supply chain.
The Technology Hierarchy, Honestly
HEFA still dominates the announced 2030 capacity stack at roughly 85 percent. It is the most mature pathway, with familiar process engineering, well-understood economics, and bankable financing. But HEFA is hitting its ceiling, and the ceiling is feedstock, not technology. Every gallon of HEFA SAF needs about 1.5 gallons of lipid feedstock — fats, oils, and greases — and that pool is not growing fast enough to fund the announced plant pipeline.
Alcohol-to-jet sits in the most interesting position right now. LanzaJet's Georgia plant can produce up to 10 million gallons per year, and the underlying feedstock — ethanol — is one of the most widely produced industrial liquids on the planet. Global ethanol output is over 28 billion gallons a year, with mature logistics and supply chains. Unlike UCO, which has to be aggregated from thousands of restaurants and food processors, ethanol can be sourced wherever there is biomass.
Fischer-Tropsch sits in third place today, but has the highest theoretical ceiling. Convert solid biomass — including municipal waste — into liquid fuels through gasification, and you unlock feedstock volumes that dwarf everything else. DG Fuels is targeting a 600,000 tonne per year facility with production costs around 1,500 dollars per tonne. Pioneer plants currently run closer to 4,800 dollars per tonne, but those economics typically improve fast as scale and operational learning accumulate.
Power-to-liquid e-fuels sit at the bottom of today's economics. They are five times the cost of conventional jet fuel and only viable with very large subsidies — Rotterdam's Power2X project, for example, requires roughly 1.5 billion euros to be financeable. They are not going away, but they are a policy bet, not a market bet.
The Cost Math People Quietly Run
HEFA production cost runs from about 5.49 to 8.52 dollars per gallon, with feedstock as the largest line item. As UCO climbs, those numbers go up, not down. Alcohol-to-jet has a theoretical floor near 2.83 dollars per gallon assuming ethanol at 1.70 dollars per gallon. Even with capital and processing complexity layered on, ATJ has a clear pathway to competitiveness. Fischer-Tropsch can plausibly hit the same range at scale.
The US Department of Energy projects HEFA and ATJ together will make up 89 percent of US SAF in 2030 — 66 percent HEFA, 23 percent ATJ. That projection probably underestimates how fast feedstock pressure will tilt the mix toward ATJ, especially as more LanzaJet-style plants come online and prove the operating envelope.
Policy Is Distorting, Not Driving
The policy landscape is doing two contradictory things at once. CORSIA Phase 1 launched in January 2026, requiring airlines with emissions over 10,000 tonnes of CO2 to offset growth above 2019 levels. Participation is voluntary through 2026, but it is the first global carbon accounting system for aviation, and SAF use directly reduces offset obligations. That creates real, additive value beyond the direct fuel cost.
European policy is more aggressive and more distortive. ReFuelEU Aviation requires 6 percent SAF by 2030, including a 2.6 percent slice of e-fuels — power-to-liquid synthetics from captured CO2 and renewable electricity. Germany has gone further, mandating 0.5 percent power-to-liquid in 2026 rising to 2 percent by 2030. The arithmetic problem here is unavoidable: if e-fuels cost five times jet fuel, the resulting compliance bill is large enough to deform airline route economics.
The result is a bifurcated market. Carriers operating in Europe face compliance costs that can only be met through expensive subsidized e-fuels, while carriers elsewhere can pick the cheapest qualifying SAF. That arbitrage will not last forever, but it shapes near-term competitive dynamics in ways that get downplayed in public ESG narratives.
Airline Commitments Are Mostly IOUs
The headline airline announcements look impressive. Delta has secured 910 million gallons through deals with Gevo and DG Fuels, targeting 5 percent SAF by 2030. American has locked in 620 million gallons. United is using 10 million gallons in 2025, triple their 2022 volume. British Airways has committed to 260 million gallons of Twelve's e-fuel over fourteen years.
The crucial detail rarely makes it into press releases: most of these agreements lack fixed pricing, and many of the suppliers do not yet have operational facilities. Airlines are essentially placing very long-dated bets on future technology deployment and cost curves. This is not normal commodity contracting. It is closer to corporate venture capital with a fuel offtake wrapper.
Chinese carriers are taking a different path. Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern are coordinating SAF adoption through government-directed programs rather than running individual procurement strategies. Once Chinese production capacity actually comes online, that centralized buying could move faster than anything we have seen out of the US or EU.
In the energy business, access to cheap raw materials usually beats process efficiency. The SAF industry is rediscovering that truth in real time.
The Municipal Waste Wildcard
Municipal solid waste is the great untapped feedstock. American cities alone generate enough material to theoretically supply meaningful SAF volumes, but turning garbage into jet fuel requires sophisticated gasification and gas-cleanup systems. The technology exists — Fulcrum BioEnergy and others have spent years on it — but commercial deployment has been brutally hard, with multiple high-profile setbacks.
What makes municipal waste interesting is the cost structure flip. Cities pay tipping fees to dispose of waste. If that waste can be converted into jet fuel, the input goes from a positive cost to a negative cost. Several Chinese cities are running pilot municipal-waste SAF projects as part of broader urban waste strategies. The framing there is not "we want to make jet fuel" — it is "we have a waste problem, and jet fuel is a useful byproduct of solving it."
That framing matters. It changes who funds the project, how it gets permitted, and who bears the technology risk. If even one Chinese municipal-waste-to-SAF project hits commercial reliability, Fischer-Tropsch jumps the queue.
The Green Premium Is the Real Bottleneck
The green premium — the cost gap between SAF and conventional jet fuel — is still the structural blocker. HEFA SAF runs 2 to 2.5 times the price of petroleum jet fuel, even after current US incentives. The Inflation Reduction Act provides 1.75 dollars per gallon in tax credits for qualifying SAF, and California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard can add over 100 dollars per tonne of CO2-equivalent. Even stacking maximum policy support, most pathways do not reach parity with petroleum.
This creates the classic coordination problem. No individual airline wants to pay a green premium unless competitors do too. Passengers are not willing to pay materially more for sustainable fuel. Suppliers will not build expensive plants without binding offtake. Everyone is waiting for someone else to move first, or for policy to force the issue.
The Likely Shape of 2030
HEFA probably keeps its leading market share through 2027 because it is already deployed. But feedstock pressure will tighten every year, and the pathway has limited ability to break through it. Alcohol-to-jet capacity should scale rapidly between 2026 and 2029 as more facilities like LanzaJet's come online and the operating envelope is de-risked. Fischer-Tropsch commercial deployment likely lags into the late 2020s but could then scale very quickly given the feedstock potential.
Regional specialization is increasingly likely. The US has a structural advantage in corn ethanol and agricultural residues, which makes alcohol-to-jet and eventually Fischer-Tropsch the natural pathways. Europe's limited biomass resources combined with aggressive mandates create a niche for expensive power-to-liquid fuels — essentially a publicly subsidized industry. China's combination of waste management challenges and manufacturing capacity points to municipal-waste Fischer-Tropsch and ethanol-based ATJ as the most natural fit.
Where the Bet Should Sit
HEFA projects face increasing feedstock cost pressure and limited growth. Alcohol-to-jet companies like LanzaJet are in the sweet spot of proven technology plus scalable feedstocks. Fischer-Tropsch developers with reliable access to low-cost biomass could be the biggest 2030 winners, especially if Chinese municipal-waste projects validate the pathway. Power-to-liquid is essentially a policy bet — it works where governments commit to large, sustained subsidies, and breaks where they do not.
The harder truth, though, is that the winner of the SAF race in 2030 will not be determined by who has the best conversion technology or the lowest theoretical production cost. It will be determined by who has the most robust, scalable, and lowest-cost feedstock supply chain. Used cooking oil priced its way out of the future. The next pathway has to source from something abundant — ethanol, agricultural residue, municipal waste — or it does not scale.
The SAF race is really three races stacked on top of each other. There is a technology race for the best conversion process. There is an economics race for the lowest production cost. And there is a feedstock race for the cheapest, largest, most reliable raw material stream. Right now, alcohol-to-jet is winning on technology maturity plus feedstock access. Fischer-Tropsch has the highest scale potential. HEFA is losing on feedstock despite leading on maturity. Power-to-liquid is too expensive without massive subsidies.
By 2030, the successful SAF companies will be the ones that locked in abundant, low-cost feedstocks early — not the ones that won the engineering trade studies. In the energy business, access to cheap raw materials usually beats process efficiency. The SAF industry is rediscovering that truth in real time, and the price of used cooking oil is the headline indicator. Watch it.